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Abstract. I urge philosophers of religion to investigate far more vigorously 
than they have until now the acceptability of varied components of the world 
religions and their epistemological underpinnings. By evaluating “acceptability” 
I mean evaluation of: truth, morality, spiritual effi  cacy and human fl ourishing, 
in fact any value religious devotees might think signifi cant to their religious 
lives. Secondly, I urge that philosophers of religion give more attention to what 
scholars have called the “esoteric” level of world religions, including components 
of strong ineff ability, weak ineff ability, and an alleged perennial philosophy. All 
this should involve a cooperative eff ort between analytic, comparative, and 
feminist philosophy of religion. 
PREFACE
I was born to and raised in a traditional Jewish family in Detroit, 
Michigan. As a child, my deepest impression of Christianity was as 
a dark, sinister, threatening force. It started with our devout Christian 
downstairs landlady when I was playing out in front of the house at the 
age of fi ve. She lured me to her door and gave me a piece of bacon. She 
closed the door and watched gleefully from a window as I ate it. I thought 
it was rather tasty but not terrifi c. Terrifi c it wasn’t when I told my parents 
of the event. Whenever we made any bit of noise upstairs over her head, 
this Christian lady would bang hard on her ceiling with the stick end of 
her broom to demand silence. Clearly, a Christian suppression of the 
Jews!
On one Sunday aft ernoon car ride, my father pointed out to me an 
impressive church where, he said, a woman had been murdered that 
very Christmas eve. Menacing. Soon aft er there were the churches that 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2011), PP. 43–66
44 JEROME GELLMAN
displayed – right outside in front – a kind of a statue of a man who had 
died aft er obviously being savagely tortured. Now, let me ask you – if 
a dress shop displays dresses out front and a shoe shop displays shoes, 
what must this shop be up to? You guessed it: this was a place where 
they brought people to be tortured and murdered. Th en there were 
the stories in my Jewish school about priests who long ago, in Eastern 
Europe, would kidnap sweet Jewish children, like me, who were never 
to be found again; stories about the Spanish Inquisition and expulsion of 
the Jews from Spain, and the Christian pogroms; and in Detroit, Father 
Charles Edward Coughlin’s Sunday radio broadcasts accusing the Jews 
both of being the chief communists and of being the chief capitalistic 
pigs (excuse the expression from someone who has eaten bacon 
only once.)1 
Th ose childhood impressions still lie very deep inside me, even aft er 
these many years of knowing many wonderful Christians, having read 
wise and spiritually enriching Christian thought, and even spending 
a year at the home of the Fighting Irish.2 But these later experiences 
have greatly diminished my apprehension to the point where I can 
appreciate much in Christianity, although I believe that Jesus was neither 
the Messiah nor divine, and although I have no opinion on whether the 
Spirit proceeds directly from the Father alone or also through the Son. 
I write what follows, then, as a person who in the United States lived in 
a religious minority that historically the majority religion had persecuted. 
And I write this as a person who in the country in which I now reside, 
Israel, is part of a religious majority that must act with respect to its 
Islamic, Christian, Druze, and Circassian religious minorities. What 
I seek is more emphasis on an honest assessment of the acceptability of 
beliefs and practices across the world religions including various “levels” 
of religious understanding and practice. Moreover, I seek doing this in 
a way that encourages overall respect and even appreciation of the good 
motivations and fruits of a religion where that is possible, even when 
judging some elements of that religion unacceptable. 
1 Although the broadcasts ended at the time of my birth so I never heard them, the 
Jews of Detroit were still “hearing” them for many years beyond. 
2 Th is is an esoteric reference to the University of Notre Dame, a splendid Catholic 
university in Indiana. 
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INTRODUCTION
In his monumental Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 
1900-2000, Eugene Long divides the discipline at the end of the twentieth 
century into fi ve categories: analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and 
deconstruction, critical theory, comparative philosophy, and feminist 
philosophy.3 In what follows, I focus on analytic philosophy, comparative 
philosophy, and feminist philosophy, areas I know more about than 
the others on Long’s list. So, when I write below about philosophy of 
religion I will always mean the discipline as represented by those three 
subdivisions. 
I urge philosophers of religion, fi rst, to investigate far more vigorously 
than they have until now the acceptability of varied components of the 
world religions, as well as their epistemological underpinnings in what 
scholars have called “exoteric” religion. By evaluating “acceptability” 
I mean evaluation of: truth, morality, spiritual effi  cacy and human 
fl ourishing, in fact any value religious devotees might think signifi cant 
to their religious lives. Secondly, I want to urge that philosophers of 
religion give more attention to a comprehensive inquiry across world 
religions into what scholars have called “esoteric” religion. Th is should 
include not only testing the claim, sometimes made quite forcefully, that 
religions are identical or at least very close to one another at this level. 
Also, the various “esoteric” forms of religion should be tested for their 
inner coherence and acceptability. In short, I propose a dialectic between 
evaluating the contents of the world religions and investigating with 
philosophical acumen and integrity the possibilities of closer agreement 
between religions. All this should include a cooperative eff ort between 
analytic, comparative, and feminist philosophy of religion. 
Now, in proposing these undertakings I am not so naïve as to expect 
that philosophers will solve many issues with anything like a consensus. 
(I take to heart Peter van Inwagen’s keen observation that in philosophy 
very little ever gets settled.4) Nonetheless, philosophers of religion can 
3 Eugene Long, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900-2000 (Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). 
4 Peter van Inwagen, “Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Any-
thing on Insuffi  cient Evidence?” in Philosophy: Th e Big Questions, Ruth J. Sample, Charles 
W. Mills, and James P. Sterba, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 87-98. 
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make progress in their discipline in a number of ways: (1) By reaching 
a consensus or coming near to one wherever possible, (2) By deepening 
and clarifying for (at least) one’s own self, to then recommend to others, 
the ranking of elements in the world religions regarding their truth 
and other values of acceptability, (3) By getting to the bottom of and 
assessing the epistemologies of diff erent religions, and (4) By assessing 
a philosopher’s understanding of the implications of other world religions 
from the vantage point of her own religion. For example, this would be 
for a Christian philosopher to go beyond defending Christian belief, to 
evaluate, say, Shaivism (the worship of Shiva in India) with the tools for 
evaluation provided by her own brand of Christianity. 
Here I am reminded of Alvin Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian 
philosophers.” Th ere he writes that, “Th e Christian community . . . ought 
to get on with the project of exploring and developing the implications 
of Christian theism for the whole range of questions philosophers ask 
and answer.”5 Christian philosophers have the right, avers Plantinga, to 
wield their own perspectives on philosophical issues. Th is, I urge, should 
apply to Christian philosophers, as well as to members of other religions, 
namely, to consider the content as well as the fact of the very existence 
of other religions from their religious view. (I would add that in such an 
undertaking the philosopher of religion is not to be protected a priori 
from coming to see serious problems within his own religion.)
One should not confuse my proposals that include evaluating “other” 
religions, with the position that when faced with religious diversity 
a follower of one religion is obligated to consider the justifi cation of 
his own religious adherence. My proposals pertain to philosophers of 
religion, religious and atheist alike, acting as philosophers. And even when 
I urge acting, say, qua Christian philosophers, as in point (3) above, I do 
not believe they are obligated to do so in virtue of following one religion 
when aware of the variety of world religions.6 
5  Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy, (1984) 
1, 253-271.
6 Indeed, I have argued that no such obligation exists, at least not across the board. 
See: Jerome Gellman, “Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justifi cation of Religious 
Belief,” Faith and Philosophy 10, (1993), pp. 45-364. (Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion, 
Th e Big Questions eds. Michael Murray and Eleonore Stump (Oxford, Blackwell: 1999), 
pp. 441-453. And: Jerome Gellman, “In Defense of a Contented Exclusivist,” Religious 
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What was once a global village has since become a global apartment 
house.7 No longer in the West is it only Christian denominations 
facing skeptics whom they wish to turn aside. Christians are no longer 
ensconced in a cocoon-like mutually supportive religious culture for 
which Hindus and Sikhs are exotic pictures that show up in travelogues. 
Western Christian analytic philosophers journey for long stays in China, 
and the Association of Christian Philosophers holds a conference 
in Hong Kong attended by Chinese, American, European, and Israeli 
analytic philosophers. We are now progressively intertwined with one 
another, and exposed in the mass media and on the street to one another’s 
religions. Th e issues that arise for many people today, for example 
Christians, are beyond skeptical assaults on Christianity and Christian 
apologetics, and beyond attempts to reform Christianity in light of its 
alleged moral failures. Th ere is much uncertainty and confusion out 
there about what the world religions “really” mean to teach, and what, if 
anything, in various religions is acceptable. While knowing similarities 
and diff erences is crucial, obviously it is not suffi  cient for trying to calm 
the noise coming through the thin walls from the neighboring apartments 
inside our creaking, tottering, apartment building. Philosophers of 
religion should take up the challenge into the center of the discipline. 
SOME SETTING UP
Th e Exoteric and Esoteric
To set this all up I begin with “exoteric” and “esoteric.” Th e Oxford 
dictionary defi nes “exoteric” as “Designed for or suitable to the generality 
of disciples; communicated to outsiders, intelligible to the public,” and 
“esoteric” as “Designed for, or appropriate to, an inner circle of advanced 
or privileged disciples; communicated to, or intelligible by, the initiated 
exclusively.” Th is distinction has turned blurry since in many Western 
circles these labels are not as valid as they were. Increasingly what used 
to be esoteric in religion has become known and popularized beyond 
Studies, 36 (2000), 401-417. (Reprinted in Readings in Philosophy of Religion: East Meets 
West, ed. Andrew Eshleman, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 374-383.)
7 I owe this felicitous turn of phrase to Evan Fales. 
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an inner circle of enthusiasts. Witness, for example, the popularity of 
religious mysticism, which once was a carefully restricted religious 
domain. Nowadays, much that used to be esoteric has spilled over to 
become far more known and appreciated.8 I am interested only in the 
respective components of what were once considered two realms separated 
by the number and status of their adherents. And my interest includes 
only components of esoteric traditions that interpret exoteric beliefs 
and practices. I exclude aberrant ideas and practices that followers keep 
secret, like magic and astrology, in the service of religion.
In order to denote only the components without ascribing the 
Oxford Dictionary’s meanings, in what follows I will write “Exoteric” 
and “Esoteric” with a capital “e” for the religious content itself that used 
to be relatively clearly exoteric and esoteric, not for what we can properly 
describe today as “exoteric” and “esoteric,” with a small case “e.” I realize 
that the lines between even Exoteric and Esoteric are not clearly drawn 
and that to speak of just two realms is a gross simplifi cation. But I am in 
the business of making some proposals and for that purpose my rough 
and ready distinction between Exoteric and Esoteric will do fi ne. 
Exoteric religion, then, pertains to what used to be the domain of 
plain, and even most fancy, educated folk, and largely remains so. In 
theistic religions this would include belief in a God distinct from the 
world and conceived in an anthropomorphic way or else in a fashion 
much analogous to us, having power, knowledge, goodness and the 
like but supremely heightened in form and degree. In a non-theistic 
religion, like Buddhism, for another example, this would include taking 
the dharma teachings of Buddha about no-self, karma, enlightenment, 
interdependent co-arising, etc. at face value, as literal metaphysical truths. 
And in all religions this would include having a conception of religious 
behavior and of ritual appropriate to the beliefs and the concomitant 
religious aims of Exoterism. 
In the Esoteric area I focus on three types, which involve some overlap 
yet are diff erent enough to warrant individual attention:
8 Indeed, several modern day kabbalists insist on teaching hitherto esoteric teachings 
of kabbalah in Judaism to the masses if the Messiah is to come. As a result, kabbalah is 
now popular well beyond an inner circle of Jewish kabbalists. 
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Strong Ineff ability
Th e great third century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna once wrote, 
“Th ere is no dharma whatsoever taught by the Buddha to whomever, 
whenever, wherever.”9 Th is statement fl atly contradicts the Buddhist 
belief in the Th ree Jewels of: the Buddha, the dharma, and the sangha. 
How could the devout Nagarjuna deny one of the Th ree Jewels? Th e 
answer lies in the Mahayana Lankavatara Sutra and Shurangama Sutra. 
Th e Lankavatara Sutra portrays the Buddha as saying, “All the teachings 
in the Sutras are fi ngers pointing to the moon.” And in the Shurangama 
Sutra the Buddha says,
If someone uses a fi nger to point out the moon to another person, if that 
person takes the fi nger to be the moon, he will not only fail to see the moon, 
but he will also fail to see the fi nger. He mistakes the pointing fi nger for the 
bright moon.”10
To say the Buddha had “teachings,” i.e., linguistically conveyed statements 
meant to be true, would be to fasten onto the teachings themselves, study 
them, and apply them, as end points. Th is would be to fasten on to the 
fi nger. It would be to miss the moon, that which the Buddha could never 
teach because it is ineff able, but to which he was always pointing. 
Th ere is a Zen story that at Vulture Peak (Grdhrakuta) Buddha gave 
a dharma talk consisting entirely of his holding a fl ower and twirling it 
in his fi ngers. One monk’s (Mahakapahsa’s) smile indicated that he had 
understood the revelation.11
And the Tao Te Ching begins with the words, “Even the fi nest teaching 
is not the Tao itself. Even the fi nest name is insuffi  cient to defi ne it. 
Without words, the Tao can be experienced, and without a name, it can 
be known.”12 
9 Nagarjuna, Th e Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Nagarjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Jay L. Garfi eld, tr. (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), chapter 25.
10 Th e Shurangama Sutra (Burlingame, CA: Buddhist Text Translation Society, 2003), 
p. 30.
11 Zen Flesh Zen Bones, A Collection of Zen and Pre-Zen Writings, compiled by Paul 
Reps and Nyogen Senkazi (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 1998), pp. 121-122.
12 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Translated by Stan Rosenthal (Shi-tien Roshi), Available at: 
http://www.vl-site.org/taoism/ttcstan2.html. 
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In the case of strong ineff ability, there are no teachings because 
whatever is said is cancelled out, having the function only of pointing to 
what is ineff able. Exoteric religion points to the moon and has value for 
those who cannot (yet) see as far as that. 
Weak Ineff ability
In this form of Esoterism, there do exist teachings. What is said is not 
cancelled out, but remains true, however, what is referred to is something 
ineff able. I have in mind the via negativa, or “apophatic theology.” In 
Christianity this is perhaps most identifi ed with Pseudo-Dionysius, 
and later with the anonymous author of Th e Cloud of Unknowing. In 
Judaism it is most identifi ed with Maimonides and forms of kabbalah. In 
Maimonides’ version, the via negativa, maintains that God is indescribable 
with positive attributes. However, all negative attributions to God, denials 
of positive attributes, are true. Statements ascribing positive attributes to 
God are category mistakes and in Esoterism undergo translation into 
negative statements. So, what one says in negative theology about God is 
true, but the theology points to an ineff able God. As with Maimonides, 
while the positive beliefs about God of standard religion are false, they 
are necessary for the religious life. (Guide for the Perplexed 3: 28) 13
We need to distinguish the via negativa from a diff erent form of 
unsaying belonging to the category of strong ineff ability. In this form, 
which you can fi nd in Zen for example, one is to deny, in sequence, 
each statement one makes in an endless chain, so that every statement 
remains “unsaid.” In this form of negation, the denial of a denial does not 
return us to a positive statement, but only provides the next statement 
to deny.14
Th e Perennial Philosophy
Th e term “perennial philosophy” is an old one. Various scholars, 
including Ananda Coomaraswamy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Frithjof 
Schuon and Huston Smith, have revived the claim that all (or nearly all) 
religions have a common Esoteric “perennial philosophy” (PP), distinct 
13 Maimonides does say that our silence is most befi tting God. Th at is with regard to 
speaking of God in positive attributes. Th e negative attributions remain true.
14 See Th ich Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys (Doubleday: New York, 1974), chapter 5. 
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from Exoteric religion. 15 PP has these metaphysical and epistemological 
components (greatly simplifi ed and boiled down): 
(PP1) A monistic metaphysics in which there exists an infi nite Reality 
(my term) that is the only true reality (hence, “absolute”). 
(PP2) Th e Reality is neither personal nor impersonal, being beyond 
these categories. 
(PP3) Th e Reality constantly infuses the world with grace, drawing us 
to the consciousness of our true being resting within the Reality.
(PP4) Th ere is a universal human intuition of the existence of the 
Reality as the one true reality. 
(PP5) Our worldly existence masks and distorts this intuition. 
(PP6) It is possible to retrieve this consciousness, to become 
transformed by overcoming the sense of separateness from the Reality 
and orientation toward a separate ego. 
(PP7) PP in various versions provides methods and disciplines for 
realizing life transformed (resulting from the reinterpretation of 
Exoteric practices and beliefs). 
PP converts “ordinary” religious statements (the fi nger) into PP talk (the 
moon), on the grounds that the former arise from within the depths of 
one’s soul where the universal intuition lies, only to be distorted on the 
way up. For example, that God is creator ex nihilo points to the truth 
that nothing exists but the Reality. And that God is morally good is 
based on a correct intuition of the Reality’s metaphysical “goodness,” 
in the constant fl ow of grace from the Reality. Th is intuition however, 
manifests in Exoterism masked by a concept of goodness informed by 
self-interest. 
15 For the bibliography of Coomaraswamy’s works see: Ananda K.Coomaraswamy: 
Bibliography and Index, Rama P. Coomaraswamy, ed. (Berwick-upon-Tweed: Prologos 
Books, 1988). For the bibliography of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, see Th e Philosophy of 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, L.E. Hahn, R.E. Auxier, and L. W. Stone, Jr., eds. (Peru, Ill.: Open 
Court, 2001), part 3. Th e bibliography of Frithjof Schuon is available at: http://www.
frithjofschuon.info/public/writings/bibliography.aspx. Of Huston Smith’s many books 
the following are the most central to my concerns here: Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: 
Th e Common Vision of the World’s Religions (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1992), Th e 
Religions of Man (New York: Perennial Library, 1989), and Th e World’s Religions: Our 
Great Wisdom Traditions (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991).
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We need to distinguish PP from its cousin, John Hick’s Pluralistic 
Hypothesis (PH) in which the “Real” is the actual goal of all religious 
practice.16 Here are some salient diff erences:
1. In PH the Real is distinct from the world, while in PP the Reality 
is not.
2. PH does not attempt to translate ordinary religious talk into the 
argot of PH, while PP provides an isomorphic transform-scheme for 
at least core standard pronouncements.
3. PH is a hypothesis about religions, not claiming that any religion 
tradition has endorsed it. PP-ers, on the contrary, claim PP to exist 
within and to be an important part of almost all religious traditions.
4. PH is not interested to judge the truth or falsity of any Exoteric 
religious doctrine, concentrating instead on how these are employed 
with reference to the Real. PP, on the other hand, judges standard 
beliefs as not quite true, yet refl ecting deep truths, existing in PP. 
SO LET’S START (FINALLY)
Now for my suggested program for philosophy of religion in the twenty-
fi rst century. My interest is to broaden topics in philosophy of religion 
and bring them cooperatively from the sides to the center. My program 
pertains to the Exoteric, to the Esoteric, and to the relationship between 
them in the world religions. 
THE EXOTERIC
Religions are starkly inconsistent with one another in their Exoteric doc-
trines, in the explanations they give of important facts, and in what they 
expect their devotees to be doing with their time. Rather than ignore these 
16 John Hick has expounded this view in many books and articles. See John Hick, 
An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). For a not-quite-up-to-date bibliography of his writing, see 
David Cheetham, John Hick: A Critical Introduction and Refl ection (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003).
53I CALLED TO GOD FROM A NARROW PLACE
inconsistencies or pretend that they are not signifi cant to religious devo-
tees, philosophers should engage in evaluating the acceptability of major 
components of the world religions. I am talking about evaluations across 
world religions, both evaluating major religious components of a single 
religion by itself as well as evaluating religions relative to one another.
In addition, philosophers should investigate diff erent religions for what 
sort of epistemologies they embrace. Th e late William Jellema, of Calvin 
College, taught, so I have been told, that Christians had a diff erent con-
cept of “rationality” than other folks. Do religions really diff er over their 
understanding of rationality? Philosophers of religion should investigate 
and evaluate the epistemologies that go along with various religions. 
So, here is a sampling of the kind of topics I have in mind for the 
philosophy of religion of Exoterism: 
 1. Enlightenment: Various religions, Eastern religions in particular, 
emphasize reaching enlightenment, variously interpreted; 
a permanent state of a person who is then forever released from 
his/her former condition. Is this a realistic possibility for mere 
mortals or are we caught in what Judaism calls “ritzo v’shov,” 
moving back and forth between a higher and a lower spiritual 
state, never reaching constancy in this life? In addition, what are 
the implications of ascribing enlightenment to a person for the 
creation and protection of authority and control? 
 2. No-Self: Buddhism teaches that there is no self. Hindu religions 
teach there is a self, but it is identical with Brahman, not a separate 
entity. Exoteric Christianity teaches the existence of a separate self, 
as do Judaism and Islam. Historically in Western philosophy, the 
issue of the existence of the self revolved around Hume’s rejection 
of its existence. Philosophers of religion, with some outstanding 
exceptions, have not suffi  ciently addressed the issue in the context 
of the diversity of religions.17 
 3. Evil: Th e problem of evil has been around quite a long time. 
Philosophers should examine treatments of evil in both theistic 
and non-theistic religions. Th is should include such issues as these: 
How consistent is an explanation of evil to the religious scheme in 
17 See below for an important exception. William Wainwright has also touched on 
this in William J. Wainwright, Mysticism, A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value, and 
Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981).
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which it is off ered? Does it solve the problem in logical terms? 
How does a particular treatment of evil fare in moral terms? How 
do non-theistic treatments fare against theistic ones? 
 4. Divine Reversal: Christianity used to claim, and part of it continues 
to claim, that it supersedes Judaism: God had made a covenant 
with the Israelites described as “for ever.” (Exodus 31:16) Th en, 
God annulled those commandments in favor of “circumcision of 
the heart.” (Romans 2:28) Could God change His mind like that? 
Th e Jewish philosopher Saadia Gaon (882-942) argued that God 
could not do so (despite many biblical passages apparently to the 
contrary). Th is forced him to novel interpretations of the sacrifi ce 
of Isaac, where apparently God fi rst issues and then annuls 
a commandment to Abraham. Can God have a change of mind? 
If God cannot change His mind, did God utter a falsehood at the 
start when giving a command “for ever”?
 5. Th e Fact of Religious Diversity: Th ere exists a multitude of religions 
in our world, some claiming hundreds of millions of followers. 
Each religion should be able to explain that fact convincingly from 
its own point of view. Why do only the people of India know about 
worshipping Vishnu, Shiva, and Krishna? If the Jews are God’s 
chosen people, why do the religions of the majority of people on 
earth not know of them or know almost nothing about them? 
Which religion(s) best explain the variety and great number of 
religions and the immense number of followers in religions other 
than its/their own?
 6. Devotee non-Fidelity: In the history of some religions, the most 
ardent believers and the religious hierarchy have had rather bleak 
histories of practicing what the religion teaches. It does not follow, 
of course, that the religion is false. However, a religion should be 
able to give a good explanation of how it was that its teachings 
were not compelling enough to create a responsible leadership 
that implemented its teachings. How do diff erent religions fare in 
giving such explanations, and how do religions fare relative to one 
another?18
18 Th is divides into two: (1) How do religious explanations fare with regard to 
scientifi c or quasi-scientifi c ones, and (2) How does a religion fare in its own terms in 
giving an explanation, in comparison to other religions. 
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 7. Sexuality: Religions have varied ways of thinking about human 
sexuality. Some endorse celibacy as an ideal way of life. Others 
think it an obligation to have children. Some think of “carnal 
knowledge” as an untidy aff air they tolerate as unavoidable. Others 
don’t make much of a fuss about sexuality. Still others see sexual 
intercourse as part of the way to enlightenment. In light of what we 
now know of sexuality through science, with new moral insights 
and in light of the wide failure of celibacy in some religions, which 
attitudes to sexuality are now the most acceptable? How valid are 
the various rationales for particular attitudes?
 8. A Harsh God: In the Hebrew Bible (Th e “Old Testament”), God 
appears at times as a harsh being quite at odds with the idealized 
picture of God in some of later Judaism and Christianity. In the 
Quran as well God can be quite harsh. How well do religions deal 
with this fact? Does any religion do better than others? 19
 9. Epistemology: Do diff erent religions have diff erent epistemologies? 
If they do, which are acceptable? Which are more acceptable than 
others?20 
A recent paradigm of the kind of undertaking I am advocating is 
Buddhism, A Christian Exploration and Appraisal, a cooperative study by 
Keith Yandell, an analytic philosopher with a keen interest in Buddhism 
and Harold Netland, professor of philosophy of religion and intercultural 
studies.21 In this work the authors present a balanced and edifying 
presentation of the history of Buddhism from Siddartha Gautama the 
Buddha until the “Dharma comes West,” (a nice play on the words of 
19 Recently, two books have appeared on this topic: Paul Copan has written 
a Christian theology of the Old Testament addressing that issue. See: Paul Copan, Is 
God a Moral Monster? Making Sense of the Old Testament God (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Books, 2011). A collection of essays is Michael Bergmann, Michael J. Murray, and 
Michael C. Rea, eds. Divine Evil? Th e Moral Character of the God of Abraham (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). See my forthcoming review in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion. 
20 Th e criteria of evaluation will include meta-epistemological principles (such as 
what any epistemology must account for) as well as whatever epistemology a group of 
philosophers of religion can agree on. 
21 Keith Yandell and Harold Netland, Buddhism, A Christian Exploration and 
Appraisal (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2009).
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the Zen expression “Th e Dharma comes East” referring to Bodhidarma 
coming from India to China, bringing Zen with him.) Th ere then 
follows a sympathetic examination of Buddhist doctrines pertaining 
to such topics as Truth, Rebirth and Karma, and Enlightenment and 
Nirvana. Following this appears a sensitive evaluation of similarities and 
diff erences between Buddhism and Christianity. 
Yet, the book goes beyond comparing/contrasting Buddhism with 
Christianity. In their Introduction the authors state fl at out that, “It is our 
contention that, whatever other merits Buddhism might have, some of 
its central beliefs are deeply problematic and should be rejected.”22 Th e 
authors challenge the coherence of Buddhist metaphysics, most visibly 
a critique of the Buddhist belief in “no-self ” in favor of the existence of 
the self (as attested to by Exoteric Christianity). Th at is not all. Th e fi nal 
chapter, “Th e Dharma or Gospel?” goes further with this declaration:
Our purpose here is not to argue comprehensively for the truth of 
Christian claims as opposed to Buddhist perspectives but rather to clarify 
the diff erences between the two sets of claims and, at points, to suggest, in 
a very preliminary manner, why Christian theism is more plausible than 
Buddhism.23 
Here the authors are being modest since what follows is a serious 
discussion that presents a defense against various Buddhist statements of 
the problem of evil, and against two arguments for God’s non-existence 
by the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. Th e authors make a case for the 
historical reliability of the Gospels while casting great doubt over the 
historical reliability of the Buddhist sutras and of early Buddhist history. 
Finally, in the face of the metaphysical problems in the Buddhists’ 
way of dealing with suff ering the authors note that the crucifi xion and 
resurrection resolve these same problems, (allegedly) without or with 
fewer metaphysical problems.24 25 
22 Yandell and Netland, pp. xiv-xv. 
23 Yandell and Netland, pp. 176-177. 
24 Unfortunately, the authors do not enter much into the metaphysics of incarnation 
and resurrection or into the moral implications of vicarious atonement. 
25 Another earlier good example of what I am aft er is William J. Wainwright, Mysticism, 
A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1981). 
57I CALLED TO GOD FROM A NARROW PLACE
ESOTERISM
Philosophers have done much work on ineff ability, strong and weak, in 
religions. My proposal here is to supplement that discussion. Philosophers 
have made quite a fuss over the very meaning of “ineff ability” and have 
worried over its very meaningfulness and its political signifi cance. 
Philosophers have conducted the discussion almost entirely with regard 
to mystical religious claims. Th us, Wayne Proudfoot strongly centers his 
discussion of ineff ability on ineff ability-claims within religious mystical 
traditions and concludes that the claim is nothing more than a way for 
those traditions protectively to create and maintain a sense of mystery.26 
And the feminist philosopher, Grace Jantzen objects to ineff ability-
claims as a disturbing eff ort to remove mystical experiences from the 
realm of rational discourse.27 
Th e sole link between ineff ability and religious mysticism is 
unfortunate, because ineff ability-claims abound in places far removed 
from mystical religious traditions. Experiences of ineff ability occur in the 
arts. Regarding music, famously, Schopenhauer thought that it opened 
an experience of the “ding an sich,” Kant’s “thing in itself ” beyond all 
human categories. In Aldous Huxley’s Point Counterpoint one character 
off ers Beethoven’s trios as a proof of God’s existence. Th e best way to 
understand this is to say that the trios have the power to invoke a sense 
of the ineff able. (I must confess that it’s Beethoven’s quartets that do that 
for me.) John Dewey said it best:
If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting 
and music would not exist. Th ere are values and meanings that can be 
expressed only immediately by visible and audible qualities, and to ask what 
they mean in the sense of something that can be put into words is to deny 
their distinctive existence.28
26 Wayne, Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
27 Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). See also Pamela Anderson, “Ineff able Knowledge and Gender,” 
in Philip Goodchild, ed. Rethinking Philosophy of Religion: Approaches from Continental 
Philosophy, series edited by John Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 
pp. 162-183.
28 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 1934), p. 77. 
58 JEROME GELLMAN
My proposal for the treatment of ineff ability is for philosophers of religion 
to broaden their vision to encompass the literature of all the major world 
religions as well as all human undertakings where ineff ability fi gures, 
including the arts and sexuality. In that way, there is a greater chance to 
get into the guts of the concept and the phenomenon, and to investigate 
the possible link between ineff ability at large and the presence of God in 
the world.
Scholars of religion have investigated PP, but philosophers of religion 
have not done so enough in the ways I am about to suggest. Here too, 
philosophers have made too strong a connection between PP and 
mystical experience. Th e argument is out there that: A universal PP 
can exist only if the same mystical experiences exist across all religions. 
However, no mystical experiences are the same across religions, Hence 
there is no perennial philosophy. Th us, Steven Katz concludes, “Th ere is 
no philosophia perennis” mainly because there cannot be, by his lights, 
uniform mystical experiences across religions.29 However, even if there are 
no identical mystical experiences across religions, this is consistent with 
there being a common epistemological basis for perennial philosophy. 
Th is is because on PP the major epistemological support for PP is not in 
the fi rst place in mystical experience but in an alleged intuition common 
to all humanity. Perhaps mystical experience can back-up this intuition, 
but that is not necessary.30 Philosophers have much work to do on PP.
So here now is a sampling of my suggestions relating to Esoteric 
religion:
 1. To investigate ineff ability claims across religions together with 
such claims made outside of religious contexts.
 2. To examine Esoteric contents across religions for their internal 
consistency, and their religious adequacy.
 3. To explore the connections between the Exoteric and the Esoteric 
in each religion, to determine translational effi  cacy between the 
two (where applicable). 
 4. To search for abuses of the Exoteric/Esoteric division in creating 
false ranks of religiosity and a power structure; and to recommend, 
29 Steven T. Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in Steven T. Katz, ed. 
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 24.
30 See Huston Smith, “Is there a Perennial Philosophy?” Th e Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, 55 (1987), 553-66.
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if need be, how to make out the division, if at all, to better serve 
the religious life.
 5. To judge the epistemological basis of PP in an alleged universal 
intuition. What would show that there is such an intuition? How 
good is the PP explanation for the intuition not being visible more 
oft en at the surface? What is the epistemic value of an alleged 
universal intuition? 
 6. To weigh the degree of closeness between the Esoteric forms of the 
world religions. Is the notion of a perennial philosophy warranted? 
What is at stake in the issue?
 7. Is Esoteric religion a good way to reveal religions to be closer to 
one another than would be thought in Exoteric religions? 
THE TRACK RECORD OF PHILOSOPHERS OF RELIGION
Neither analytic philosophers, nor comparative philosophers, nor 
feminist philosophers of religion, have attended suffi  ciently to the sorts 
of topics I am suggesting.
Analytic Philosophers
Analytic philosophers of religion have stuck pretty close to Christianity 
and at best to the Judaic-Christian tradition. Th ey have thought about 
religious diversity but in a very limited way. Th ey have excelled at 
categorizing positions, from religious relativism to religious pluralism 
(hard and soft ) on to non-exclusivism and exclusivism (again, hard 
and soft ). Oft en, analytic philosophers simply suppose or hypothesize 
epistemic parity between religions without going further. 
In any case, the catfi ght is mostly over whether a follower of 
a particular religion is epistemically challenged by knowledge of other 
religions at odds with hers. David Basinger stands out as championing 
the view that “for her [one faced with religious diversity] to choose then 
to retain a purely defensive posture – for her to then claim she is under 
no obligation to consider the matter further – is for her to forfeit her 
right to claim justifiably that her perspective is superior.”31 And Alvin 
31 David Basinger, Religious diversity: A Philosophical Assessment (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), p. 13.
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Plantinga leads the clowder (look it up) in favor of exclusivism being just 
fi ne.32 Yet, the discussion stays pretty much there. “Other” religions arise 
only as examples for setting up the dilemma. Actual evaluation of world 
religions is scarce, and the Exoteric/Esoteric distinction remains quite 
a secret for much of standard analytic philosophy of religion.
Comparative Philosophy
Long defi nes “comparative philosophy of religion” as follows: “Comparative 
philosophers of religion are seeking to develop new conceptions and 
methods appropriate to analyzing religion in a comparative context” 
(p. 389). Long describes Ninian Smart as a comparativist who wants 
philosophy of religion to be neutral, and not to try to examine religious 
truth (p. 475). William Christian, who Long says is another comparativist, 
wants only to determine the diff erent ways the doctrines of diff erent 
religions can clash, while studiously avoiding “taking sides.”
Since 1990, the State University of New York Press has been publishing 
a fl agship series, “Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions.” Here 
are typical titles: 
–Applying the Canon in Islam: Th e Authorization and Maintenance of 
Interpretive Reasoning in Hanafi  Scholarship 
–Seeing through Texts: Doing Th eology among the Srivaisnavas of 
South India
–Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument: A Contemporary 
Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri Saiva Philosophy
–Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism.
Th ese are generally concerned to familiarize readers with religions not 
prevalent in the Western Northern Hemisphere and to analyze diff erences 
and similarities between them and, chiefl y, Christianity. Keith Ward has 
encouraged the comparative philosopher of religion not to stop there, 
but instead to “be prepared to revise beliefs if and when it comes to seem 
32 Alvin Plantinga, “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in Th e 
Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, K. Meeker and P. Quinn, eds., (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 172–192. I have made my own modest contribution 
to a defense of exclusivism in Jerome Gellman, “In Defense of a Contented Religious 
Exclusivist,” Religious Studies, 36 (2000), 401-417.
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necessary.”33 Th is is closer to the spirit of my suggestions rather than 
solely comparing and contrasting between religions.
 
Feminist Philosophy
Feminist philosophy of religion and feminist theology have strong 
overlaps so I treat them here as one. Formerly, feminist philosophy of 
religion focused greatly on Christianity, and a traditional version thereof. 
Some feminists, particularly Rachel Adler, Judith Plaskow, and Melissa 
Raphael did write seriously on Judaism,34 and still others studied Islam, 
notably Leila Ahmed.35 Since Rita Gross, a Buddhist, lamented in the year 
2000 the narrow focus on Christianity, work on Eastern religions has been 
more extensive.36 And of course, this has pertained only to gender issues, 
such as an Eastern fondness for Goddesses. Now, if feminist philosophers 
of religion were to engage in issues other than gender, they would no 
longer be acting as feminist philosophers. Nonetheless, those persons who 
are feminist philosophers could bring along their religious imagination 
(in a positive sense) and their keen ability to sniff  out implicit biases 
and power abuses to wider evaluations of the world religions. Feminist 
philosophy of religion stands as a warning to the rest of us against smug, 
non-self-refl ective and narrow assumptions in and about religions. 
Feminist philosophers of religion can also contribute much to the 
study of ineff ability and embodiment. One grand illustration of this 
possibility is the work of Catherine Keller, who combines feminist 
interests with studies in apophatic mysticism. 
33 Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 48.
34 Rachel Adler, Engendering Judaism, An Inclusive Th eology and Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Jewish Publication Society, 1998); Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai, Judaism from 
a Feminist Perspective (New York: HarperCollins, 1991); Melissa Raphael’s work on 
Judaism includes, Th e Female Face of God in Auschwitz: A Jewish Feminist Th eology of 
the Holocaust (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), “Judaism and Gender,” in Lindsay 
Jones, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion, Second Edition (New York: Macmillan, 2005), and 
“Jewish Feminist Th eology,” in Mary McClintock Fulkerson and Sheila Briggs, eds. Th e 
Oxford Handbook of Feminist Th eology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
35 See Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
36 Rita M. Gross, “Feminist Th eology: Religiously Diverse Neighborhood or Christian 
Ghetto? (Roundtable: Feminist Th eology and Religious Diversity),” Journal of Feminist 
Studies in Religion, (2000), p. 77.
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Explanations Of Th e Track Record
How are we to explain the reticence of philosophers of religion to judge 
religious belief and practices across religions in the ways I propose? I will 
take a stab at an answer by listing four reasons: political correctness, 
a rejection of “truth,” an endorsement of cultural incommensurability or 
isolation, and worries about religious discord. 
Political Correctness
In Western countries, in the general culture people sometimes consider it 
bad taste to examine another person’s religious beliefs. Th ere is a feeling 
among some non-religious folk that a religious attachment is both very 
precious to a devotee as well as rationally indefensible. Since this is so, it 
would embarrass a person to fi nd her religious beliefs under examination. 
Many religious folk might be equally reticent to raise the issue with regard 
to others because they might be unsure how they would defend or even 
articulate their own beliefs. Th erefore, they assume a protective strategy. 
In any case, in a culture where everyone is supposed to smile at and be 
nice to everyone else cross-religious evaluation does not get very far.
Philosophers of religion should not be part of this cultural vogue. 
Philosophy of religion should include the agenda of evaluating the 
acceptability of claims and practices across world religions, separately, as 
well as evaluating religious claims against competing ones. If philosophers 
of religion will not do it, who should? 
Rejection Of Truth
Sometimes folks reject truth in the name of “relativism.” I have never 
seen a coherent characterization of relativism, and do not know any 
proclaimed relativist who behaves as one is supposed to throughout 
the course of the day. Here is not the place to trot out the arguments.37 
From my point of view relativism is not a good reason to refrain from 
evaluation of the acceptability of the world religions. 
Some feminists have rejected truth in the name of a “no-exclusive-
truth-claims” platform, which strikes me not so much as relativism but 
37 I refer you to Alvin Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity, 1999), and Alvin Plantinga, “Postmodernism and Pluralism,” in Alvin Plantinga, War-
ranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 422-457.
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simply as a refusal to engage in truth-talk about religion. Rita Gross once 
urged feminist theologians to study religions other than Christianity to 
break the hold of exclusive religious truth claims:
One might hope and expect that feminist theology, with its sensitivity 
to diversity and to the pain of exclusion, would be among the leading 
movements to condemn exclusive truth claims in religion, and to manifest 
a diff erent, religiously diverse stance.38
Exclusive religious truth claims, so the thinking goes, are a tool to fi x 
boundaries between outsiders and insiders. So, turning to “other” 
religions in a non-judgmental way serves to collapse the binary categories 
of “us” and “them.” 
In general, feminist philosophers are wary of “truth,” thinking it 
a weapon that men have brandished to enforce obedience to patriarchy 
and to distinguish between those included and those excluded. Hence, 
I do not expect feminist philosophers of religion to consider evaluating 
the truth claims of various religions. However, feminist philosophers 
of religion can evaluate religions along other dimensions. Feminist 
philosophers judge unacceptable androcentric/patriarchal thinking 
and practices in various religions. Aft er we make adjustments as to 
“whose acceptability” and “whose power” is at stake, we should expand 
judgments beyond the categories of patriarchal/non-patriarchal, as to the 
acceptability of religious practices and values (both “theirs” and “ours”) 
in terms of morality, spiritual effi  cacy, and human fl ourishing.
Th e enterprise is fraught with danger, especially from a feminist 
perspective. Th e major danger is enlisting neighborhood (including 
androcentric) values without adequately appreciating the perspective of 
another religion and its culture. Feminist thinkers have emphasized this, 
especially lamenting the disregard of the perspectives of the marginalized 
and oppressed. We should take heed of the feminist philosopher of 
religion, Pamela Anderson when she writes: “To be objective is to be 
38 Rita M. Gross, „Feminist Th eology: Religiously Diverse Neighborhood or 
Christian Ghetto? (Roundtable: Feminist Th eology and Religious Diversity),” Journal of 
Feminist Studies in Religion, (2000), p. 77. Gross has written the by-now classic work on 
Buddhist feminism: Rita M. Gross, Soaring and Settling: Buddhist Perspectives on Social 
and Th eological Issues (N.Y.: Continuum Books, 1998).
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able to think one’s claims from the perspective of another and to reinvent 
oneself as other.”39 
Religious Insularity
A third reason for avoiding judging the acceptability of religions is that 
you cannot adequately understand a religion unless you have lived it 
from the inside. Hence, you should refrain from making solid judgments 
about a religion if you are an outsider. At the extreme, this view claims 
incommensurability between one religion and another. (Rudyard Kipling: 
“Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.”)
Now, obviously, there is some truth to this. I know this from the way 
in which non-Jews typically will understand the subtleties of my Jewish 
religion in a way that misses the point because they really cannot get 
the point from the outside. To the extent that meaning involves a living 
context, there is no substitute for living the religion itself.
However, we ought not to make too much of this fact. One is not 
excluded from understanding other religions, since one can come to 
appreciate elements of religions not one’s own by at least approximating 
an understanding of their beliefs, values, and experiences. Otherwise, 
it would not have been possible for me to have engaged in Buddhist 
meditation for many years with knowledge of Buddhist writings in the 
background and then come to anticipate stuff  I discovered only later 
in my Buddhist reading. It would not have been possible for me to 
have benefi ted in contemplative prayer from the anonymous Christian 
works Th e Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counsel, that have 
enhanced my own Jewish prayer. So, while I might not understand it 
fully, I can understand another religion enough to value at least some 
of its important content, and understand it enough to be able as well to 
depreciate other things. 
If what I just wrote was too simplistic for you and did not convince 
you, then I would argue that still we should not excuse philosophers from 
dealing with religions to which they do not belong. Philosophy should 
do the best it can, and if need be bracket such endeavors as coming from 
an etic standpoint.
39 Pamela Anderson, A Feminist Philosophy of Religion: Th e Rationality and Myths of 
Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 78. 
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Religious Peace
Th e fourth reason for refraining from religious evaluation connects to 
some of the above, and that is the desire to foster religious peace and 
avoid religious strife. Religious animosity so fi lls the world, the objection 
goes, that our foremost obligation as human beings is to diminish that 
strife as much as possible. Evaluating another religion and designating 
elements of it unacceptable will only increase and harden alienation 
between devotees of diff erent religions, amplifying the confrontational 
atmosphere so prevalent between world religions. Better to smile to one 
another and forget the diff erences.
Th is sentiment is a good and honorable one. However, philosophy 
is quite a diff erent matter. And here I answer that to the contrary, 
evaluating religions with the intellectual calm and emotional reserve of 
trained academic philosophers should be a paradigm of how people of 
one religion can relate to other religions with which they disagree. Such 
activity presents itself as a replacement for shrill polemics that can lead 
to acrimony, violence, and wars. Demonstrating how to disagree with 
respect and regard, which is my experience with Christianity, is a socially 
benefi cial activity where philosophers can have infl uence. Furthermore, 
philosophers can provide a counter to religious strife when judging the 
content of “other” religions as acceptable in one way or another. 
To address these topics satisfactorily the three strands of philosophy 
of religion should cooperate. Comparative philosophers of religion 
possess expertise in knowing in depth the details and nuances of world 
religions. Analytic philosophers have the skills to take an idea apart and 
then (try) to put it back together again with sharper corners, and they 
have the skills to sniff  out logical implications. Th ey certainly have skill 
in arguing. Feminist philosophers of religion bring an ability to uncover 
biases in what otherwise might strike one as the height of objectivity 
and fairness. Womanist feminists, largely Afro-American, can off er 
an additional perspective, other than that of WASP women university 
professors, which should be joined by perspectives of women and men 
in various cultures.40
40 A classic work of womanism is Emilie M. Townes, ed.  Embracing the Spirit: 
Womanist Perspectives on Hope, Salvation, and Transformation (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1997)
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In addition, philosophers of religion should investigate a religion in 
collaboration with informed, articulate members of that religion. Books 
alone cannot give a full picture of how beliefs and practices actually aff ect 
the religious culture. We philosophers should study and take into account 
how a religion is lived, including gaps between the way a religion looks 
on paper and the way its most serious devotees interpret it and live it on 
the ground. Oft en, devotees will shape a religion into what they think 
most important, and live it selectively. So when evaluating a specifi c 
religion we should be aware of this potential dualism in its workings.
Conclusion: Th is little boy from Detroit has grown up to be an 
analytic philosopher of religion (with side trips to Kierkegaard, Sartre, 
and Jewish thought) and has witnessed the growth of this discipline into 
a benefi cial presence for religious culture in the English-speaking world. 
In future, philosophy of religion should contribute to civil culture even 
more. Honestly assessing religious claims will further the cause of truth 
as well as demonstrate how to address religions other than one’s own 
in a civil manner even when diff ering over acceptance. By evaluating 
Esoteric religion, rather than only studying it or subjecting it to a narrow 
critique, philosophy of religion can contribute to answering the question 
as to what extent there is overlap among acceptable components of 
Esoteric religions.41
41 Jonathan Malino read this paper and gave very good comments as always. I thank 
him.
